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Research into the biological basis of emotional and motivational disorders is in danger
of riding roughshod over a patient-centered psychiatry and falling into the dualist errors
of the past, i.e., by treating mind and brain as conceptually distinct. We argue that
a psychiatry informed by computational neuroscience, computational psychiatry, can
obviate this danger. Through a focus on the reasoning processes by which humans
attempt to maximize reward (and minimize punishment), and how such reasoning is
expressed neurally, computational psychiatry can render obsolete the polarity between
biological and psychosocial conceptions of illness. Here, the term ‘psychological’ comes
to refer to information processing performed by biological agents, seen in light of
underlying goals. We reflect on the implications of this perspective for a definition of
mental disorder, including what is entailed in asserting that a particular disorder is
‘biological’ or ‘psychological’ in origin. We propose that a computational approach
assists in understanding the topography of mental disorder, while cautioning that the
point at which eccentric reasoning constitutes disorder often remains a matter of cultural
judgment.
Keywords: computational psychiatry, dualism, optimality, psychiatric nosology, Bayesian inference
I’m gonna, I’m gonna lose my baby/So I always keep a bottle near
[The psychiatrist] said, “I just think you’re depressed.”/This, me, yeah, baby, and the rest.
A. Winehouse (2007), musician who died of alcohol intoxication in 2011
Introduction
The idea that reward processing is important in emotional and motivational psychiatric disorders
comes from a view of the mind-as-decision-maker. This idea has been developedwithin the nascent
ﬁeld of computational psychiatry, the clinical oﬀshoot of computational neurobiology. Within
this framework, ‘psychiatric disorder’ entails a breakdown in the brain’s inability to optimize
decisions. Thus, to the extent that good decisions set up the individual to optimally obtain
reward, ‘psychiatric disorder’ entails a suboptimal seeking of reward within an environment. As
an approach computational psychiatry promises much by way of future diagnostic and therapeutic
applications (Huys et al., 2011; Montague et al., 2012).
We are of course mindful that psychiatry has seen many promising directions that have
delivered much less than hoped. In this article we argue that computational psychiatry has already
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made major contributions in resolving important conceptual
divides in mental health. These have been expressed in
varying ways but are located around biological/psychological –
diagnostic/whole-person polarities (Boyle and Johnstone, 2014;
Hayes and Bell, 2014). This has led to a situation where biological
research is accused of shocking oversimpliﬁcation of the mind,
and psychosocial research accused of an equally shocking neglect
of the brain (‘mindlessness vs. brainlessness’). Intimately related
is the question of when psychiatric intervention is justiﬁed
to address mental symptoms1. Here medical professionals may
inappropriately diagnose and prosecute biological interventions
(Szasz, 1960), while psychological therapists can be just as
disempowering (Dolnick, 1998; Romito, 2008). These splits, like
old religious conﬂicts in Europe, concern resource or power
struggles among ‘denominations’ as much as they concern
disagreements of substance (Bentall, 2009). It is important to note
that that a resolution of the latter, to which our present work
contributes, may only make slow inroads into the former.
An unhealthy mind is one disposed to make bad decisions
and there is no end of examples in psychiatry. Decisions are
not just the sine qua non of overt actions, such as a decision
of a patient with depression to stay all day in bed, or drink
a lethal quantity of vodka and die. We are also ‘deciding’
when we believe a proposition such as ‘my wife has been
replaced by a double,’ or believe our senses when they inform
that ‘I look fat’ – as in the body image distortion seen in
anorexia – right through to a conclusion that ‘the voice is
real’ in psychosis. Good decisions on the other hand entail
those (among others) that lead to a healthy life, maintain
safety and successful reproduction. Computational psychiatry
goes further, postulating that healthy organisms take optimal
decisions, given their resources. ‘Good decisions’ cannot but be
those that successfully obtain the ‘best reward,’ those which
are good in life and for life. We can call this the Leibnitz2
principle – the best possible world of decision-making is with
us. Within this framework, ‘psychiatric disorder’ entails an
inability to optimize decisions. Thus, to the extent that good
decisions set up an individual to optimally obtain reward,
‘psychiatric disorder’ entails a suboptimal reaping of possible
reward.
Common sense tells us that motivational and emotional
disorders are central to most psychiatric disorders such as drug
dependence, clinical depression or schizophrenia. For example,
craving is a key motivational disturbance and DSM5 rightly
includes it in the 11 criteria of Substance Use Disorder (APA,
2013). In disorders of mood, the symptom of anhedonia is a
core criterion of clinical depression, marking it as a motivational
and emotional disorder. It is also likely that the fears expressed
within persecutory delusions are signs of deeply disordered
emotional processing, whereby a diseased brain has recruited
basic motivational and emotional mechanisms, originally meant
1A most curious term: a symptom without a mental dimension is not a symptom
but a sign.
2Leibnitz claimed that we live in the best world that could possibly (logically,
self-consistently) exist. He was famously satirized by Votaire in ‘Candide’ [en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Candide], exemplifying the normativity-pathology dialectic
that is highly relevant to us.
to warn and protect the individual against dire threat, in a
completely unwarranted fashion. It may also seem obvious
that psychopaths can be construed as individuals inadequately
motivated by the pain of others.
At the same time the study of reward in Psychiatry
necessitates a widening of the scope of classic computational
neurobiology to take seriously the subjective experience of
motivational and emotional symptoms. Psychiatry is ﬁrst and
foremost a branch of medicine, not of engineering. Psychiatrists
recommend biological, psychological and social interventions
ﬁrst and foremost in order to alleviate the suﬀering of a
patient, and those around the patient. Unlike other disciplines,
changing people’s behavior is not the ﬁnal goal but a part –
usually a very important part – of restoring health. Conversely,
understanding behavior motivated by reward and loss is
important for psychiatric research. If we were concerned with
physical trauma or viral illnesses, a thorough understanding of
the body’s mechanisms of immunity and tissue repair would
be important, while supporting and correcting such processes
would constitute practicing medicine. On the one hand, health
research strives to understand both the physiology (the healthy
function) and the pathophysiology (function-in-illness) of an
underlying biological substrate. On the other, the clinician helps
people who suﬀer as best as possible, while neither over- or
under- applying their craft, as condensed in the dictum ‘only
the expert surgeon knows when not to operate.’ As there is
much suﬀering which medical interventions do not help, much
maladaptive behavior and loss-related suﬀering is within the
frame of scientiﬁc interest but outside the clinical scope of
psychiatry.
Computational psychiatry focuses on those brain-based
mechanisms which strive to optimize reward within the
environment. We claim that this indivisible coupling of brain-
function-environment has already transcended the troublesome
polarities of biological vs. psychological, diseased brain vs.
maladjusted mind. Furthermore, once an optimizing of function
is understood in relation to an individual patient’s needs, the
approach also transcends polarities of normative vs. libertarian
and reductionist vs. anti-scientiﬁc psychiatry. If the study of
reward-related decision-making is our new analytic tool, then
the goal of this article is to clarify how much emotional and
motivational disorders might yield to its explanatory power. Here
we also consider foreseeable pitfalls in addition to how this new
way of seeing disorder transcends the old polarities that still
haunt psychiatry.
Methods: Review of the Normative
Account
One opportunity that a working hypothesis of optimal reward-
seeking, given one’s resources, aﬀords is that of normativity.
Behavior (be it choice between A and B or free, creative
expression) is no longer judged in comparison to a reference
sample, a ‘healthy control’ group with all the limitations this
entails. Instead behavior is compared to demonstrably optimal
solutions in face-valid but solvable tasks.
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The Bayesian Approach
In an uncertainworld, each piece of information is used to update
the person’s beliefs about the reality underlying appearances
according to this person’s rule-book of how reality gives rise to
appearance. This is what’s called ‘Bayesian inference’ see Table 1
for an illustative toy example.
This toy example does not include decisions about which
action to take as yet, only decisions about which state the world is
in (here, a self-worth state). Neither motivation nor reward, the
central topics of this work are, as yet, explicit.
It is still necessary to write down the stages of information
processing leading to normative decisions, and therefore classify
where the process may break down in psychiatric disorders.
Agents must
(1) have an adequate repertoire of classes (dimensions or
categories) that can describe the environment in which they
take decisions. ‘Can describe’ here means that beliefs about
contexts and states, including prior beliefs, are expressed in
terms of this repertoire. Does the set {worthless, worthy}
form an adequate repertoire?
(2) have an adequate generative model of what states within
the environment can give rise to the observations they
make (likelihood of states, including the intentions of other
people). Was the rule in the toy example accurate?
(3) be able to invert the generativemodel so as to determinewhat
the state of the world and the self is likely to be at any given
moment. Assuming that the world-view of the toy example
was correct, was the update belief warranted or unwarranted?
We now consider decisions about actions, rather than passive
beliefs. If, as computational neuroscience claims, brains seek the
best possible decisions then they should have values that they seek
to optimize, values which are meaningful even if not explicitly
represented.
Utility as Consistent Probability
Representation
If the value of diﬀerent outcomes that can be obtained via
diﬀerent behavioral strategies in a given context is well deﬁned
TABLE 1 | A toy example of Bayesian reasoning.
Commonsense
term
Example Bayesian term
Belief before
considering
information (before
thinking, not before
an event!)
“I am either
‘worthless’ or
‘worthy’ – both are
equally likely”
Prior belief
Salient information “My paper was
rejected”
Data (or observation)
Rule – how the world
works
The worthless get
rejected, the worthy
are appreciated.
Generative model of the
world, which provides the
Likelihood that an
underlying state of the
world will produce a datum.
Updated belief “I am worthless” Posterior belief
for an agent, we can call these values the ‘utilities’ of the diﬀerent
outcomes and map them to the probability of an agent adopting
the corresponding strategy. Rewards are outcomes that reinforce
human behavior or are reported as appetitive, desirable, hedonic,
pleasant by healthy humans. Confronted with known choices
A, B, and C an agent will ascribe ‘utilities’ u(A), u(B), u(C)
such that they can choose by applying a well-deﬁned choice
probability. For choice A, this would be π (A; u(A),u(B),u(C)).
Here we operationalize the motivational value of an outcome as
the relative (but otherwise consistent) probability with which it
is chosen. Let’s call this ‘consistent probability representation’ on
the part of the agent. The fact that this can be well-deﬁned is a
hypothesis with extremely productive consequences, which we
presently describe. It is consistent probability representation that
makes it possible to construct a full Bayesian Decision-making
psychiatry (BDP), (Montague et al., 2012; Huys et al., 2014). In
addition to 1–3 above, agents need -
(4) an adaptive utility function, as just described; and
(5) a generative model that includes an accurate prediction of
which outcomes will follow which decision, given a state of
the world and the self (model of control), so that they can
choose actions that will impact upon the state of the world to
produce outcomes with maximum utility.
We immediately note that consistent probability
representation ﬁrmly maps utility to probability – which is,
in Bayesian terms, just another kind of belief (Friston et al.,
2013); where the model of control is just part of the generative
model. Thus (4) and (5) are not additions to the Bayesian schema
but are special cases of its elements.
‘Mental disorder’ can be said to exist when this decision-
making apparatus itself is impaired, rather than reﬂecting
any issues with its inputs. Note, however, that the decision-
making apparatus by virtue of its Bayesian nature accumulates
experience. Every updated belief contains the weight of its priors
and forms the prior of the next update. Hence an ‘impairment’
may consist in the development of a decision-making apparatus
poorly adapted for the circumstance in question so that there is
no ﬁrm distinction between maladapted and diseased decision-
making apparati. At the same time there is no guarantee that
brain development will not encode posteriors into irreversible
structure. As an example, the accent with which one speaks is
part of the posteriors about the world encoded in childhood. It
is very diﬃcult to learn to pronounce a foreign language like a
native in adulthood. Hence with respect to an environment where
speaking this new language without a foreign accent is optimal,
child development has in this broad deﬁnition “damaged” the
brain.
We can now illustrate this scheme by locating motivational
and emotional problems to distinct parts of this apparatus:
(1) Development may not have equipped the patient with an
adequate repertoire of classes. A traumatic life which has set
the prior probability that others will dislike me as equal to
one can be seen to correspond to the extreme of Beck’s notion
of a core belief, which says ‘I am worthless.’ In the opening
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quote, “I’m gonna lose my baby” might be an exemplar of
such a (prior) certainty.
(2) The generative model of self and world may be inadequate,
leading to wrong estimations of likelihood. For example, one
may not have the requisite knowledge that there are common
causes of palpitations and shortness of breath other than
serious illness, setting the ground for panic anxiety. In the
Winehouse quote the dismissal of the psychiatrists’ opinion
(‘you’re depressed’) as unlikely to lead to good care may in
fact be a sign of such poverty-of-generative-model.
(3) The person may simply be cognitively impaired, so that they
can’t work backward from observations to the underlying
reality (technically, ‘model inversion’).
As above, focusing at reward contingent on actions yields two
further potential problem areas:
(4) They may believe that no decisions are available to them that
are associated with dependably good outcomes (e.g., learnt
helplessness, OCD).
(5) They may attach too much utility to certain components of
a decision (e.g., relief of negative aﬀect by ‘keeping a bottle
near’) rather than to others. In the drinking example, if the
value of the awful state that will ensue once the drug wears
oﬀ is discounted, the suﬀerer heads for a vicious cycle.
However, not all is perfect with utility-maximizing Bayesian
schema: human beings appear to violate systematically3 the
hypothesis of ‘consistent probability representation.’ We now
brieﬂy consider an alternative proposal of how people may
represent their preferences, which oﬀers a potential solution to
these violations.
Busemeyer: Preference for Reward as a
Mixture State
Suppose that decision-making is probed ﬁrst according to one of
three options, for example by asking how much one prefers A
over (B or C). We then probe how much B is preferred over C.
It turns out that the choice probabilities4 (and implied utilities)
experimentally measured are not consistent with performing the
same experiment in the alternative possible orders. This violation
of consistent probability representation – here an order eﬀect – is
one of several apparent inconsistencies in probabilistic reasoning
that people display. Various explanations has been put forward,
ranging from an erroneous bias to invocation of specialized
context eﬀects.
But what if before making the choice between A, B and
C a person does not in fact encode all decision probabilities
π(A; u(A),u(B),u(C)) etc. ? It may be that their psychological
and neurobiological state is better described as the subject
being in two or more minds, in a so-called “mixture state”
s = (a(A),a(B),a(C)) where a are the amplitudes of the mixture.
In this scenario the process of making the choice is implemented
3Though not grossly.
4Consistent choice utilities map to consistent choice probabilities. In a Bayesian
world we would require such consistency of utility. In reality the decision-making
processes people use mean that this isn’t so. This is called ‘violation of revealed
preference theory.’
as a reduction or projection of the mixture state. The rigorous
formalism used to describe the dynamics of mixture states, and
what happens at the point of reduction, was ﬁrst described in
quantum physics and recently introduced into decision making
by Busemeyer et al. (2009). The reduction or projection process
naturally produces order eﬀects: essentially, enquiring about A
automatically aﬀects B and C, and so on. The framework is
referred to as ‘quantum probability’ (QP) – an unfortunate term
in the current context as no physical quanta are involved at all.
The consequences of this framework have not been worked
out nearly as fully as, for example, a Bayesian framework. We
suggest that the experimental evidence supporting it casts some
doubt on the fundamental idea that people represent preference
probabilities corresponding to a well deﬁned utility function.
There are, however, many cases in which the two frameworks
concur (Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012) and so in this instance
we proceed with the better-worked-out Bayesian framework,
mindful that there are good reasons why its assumptions might
provide poor approximations of psychology.
Marr: Process Models in the Brain
So far we have considered reward and emotion at the level
of information processing. Computational psychiatry, however,
is not just behavioral economics or behaviorist psychology.
Following Marr (1982), we seek evidence that speciﬁc, normative,
computations we hypothesize are instantiated in neural wetware.
This in turn raises the thorny issue that a speciﬁc computation –
in the sense of a speciﬁc normative solution – can be achieved
with diﬀerent problem-solving techniques. It is the signatures of
these algorithms that we look for in the neural substrate, and the
complete account – from stimulus to neural response, to neural
computation to its representation in experimental data – is the
‘process model.’ The best-established process models relevant to
the computational psychiatry of reward are arguably those that
posit the basal ganglia as representing reward-based learning
prediction errors (Seymour et al., 2004) and of the ventral and
medial prefrontal cortex representing the values of diﬀerent
actions available to the subject (Rushworth et al., 2011).
Modeling Motivation and Emotion
There is one issue in motivational and emotional research
which has been relatively overlooked within the framework of
reward processing, and if unaddressed might reinforce dualist
splits. The working deﬁnition of motivation within the Bayesian
framework appears to claim something trivial, namely deﬁning
the motivational power of an outcome as the frequency with
which it is chosen. We can choose to call this ‘motivation,’ and
this is ﬁne if we were talking about math or physics, where there
is no danger of confusing a rigorously deﬁned quantity, say the
charge of a quark, with a property of the mind. However, here
we are also talking about motivation as experienced by patients,
so we need to be clear about what sort of claim we are making
about the semantic referents to which the term ‘motivation’
belongs. More speciﬁcally, are we claiming that the choice-
frequency deﬁnition of ‘motivation’ is to be taken for granted,
while the phenomenal experience of ‘motivation’ is a subject for
a future, maybe more optional, clariﬁcation or research? This
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would constitute a linguistic coup d’etat! The hard problem of
consciousness need not concern us here: we only need to avoid
dualism and – like good Bayesians – optimally combine both
linguistic and decision-behavioral evidence.
People place great importance in the distinction between ‘I
can’t’ and ‘I don’t care.’ ‘He doesn’t care about me’ is a much
more serious accusation than ‘he can’t understand me.’ Yet our
measurement of motivation as the currency between observable
outcomes and decision probability often makes this distinction
quite diﬃcult. Suppose buttonA givesme a piece of jellied eel four
times out of 10, and button B six times out of 10. If I prefer them
equally, is it that I am very good as working out frequencies but I
don’t care about jellied eel (no motivation), or that I’m very keen
on eel but I am incapable of working out frequencies (no ability)?
Similarly, if task performance depends on some other psychiatric
variable (say on anxiety) we could easily confuse performance at
the left side of the Yerkes–Dodson curve (arousal and motivation
too low) with performance on the right (high motivation, but
arousal detrimentally high). It is not, of course, impossible to
distinguish between the ‘I can’t’ and ‘I don’t care’ but ideally
both phenomenological and behavioral enquiry are needed. It is
interesting to note that the individual’s ‘I can’t’ may be the genetic
pool’s ‘I haven’t learnt to appreciate.’
Models traditionally address the issue of motivation-per-
outcome by ﬁtting a single parameter (often called ‘temperature’)
for each agent. More recently models have parametrized two
diﬀerent aspects of how motivating reward are, even before
considering the phenomenological level. The ﬁrst relates to how
often a choice would be made if the reward emanating from
it were immediately obtained with great certainty. Even an
obviously preferable outcome (‘do you want £5 or £0?’) may
not be chosen 100% of the time due, for example, to lapses in
attention/misunderstanding. The second aspect has to do with
how motivation to make a decision changes as the outcomes of
these decisions are, with time, more reliably inferred. This can be
seen as an ‘motivational exchange rate’ or ‘decision temperature’
pertaining to a unit change of outcome away from the point
of indiﬀerence. This pair of concepts is codiﬁed as ‘lapse rate
and inverse temperature’ in the classic RL temperature (Guitart-
Masip et al., 2012) and ‘goal priors and action precision’ in an
active inference framework (Friston et al., 2013). Note these are
not just diﬀerent names for the same variables and although they
refer to related concepts they have subtly diﬀerent computational
roles.
Although we have a working deﬁnition of motivation, we have
less of a handle on the term emotion. Our implied deﬁnition of
emotion: a positive or negative utility attaches a value upon the
outcomes with which it is associated, and thus upon the states
and decisions that lead to them, corresponding to more positive
or negative emotional states respectively. Emotion contains as
inseparable parts of each unitary phenomenological state not
only valence and magnitude but rich information about context,
intention etc. The desire for sex and the desire for knowledge are
not just diﬀerently tagged emotions, they are diﬀerent emotions.
At the moment the way that researchers relate computational
variables relate to emotions (if at all) is haphazard; yet tentative
progress is being made. In one path breaking study, Rutledge
et al. (2014) related changes in subjective well-being to several
aspects of a participants’ reward – such as their cumulative reward
(‘wealth’), immediate reward and most importantly immediate
reward compared to expectations – their reward prediction error
(RPE). Here changes in subjective wellbeing, ‘how happy do
you feel at the moment,’ were best predicted by RPEs. In
a bold formulation, Joﬃly and Coricelli (2013) posited that
the phenomenology of several emotions, not just the single
dimension of higher vs. lower wellbeing, is intimately linked to
both the temporal dynamics and the certainty of the beliefs about
how one’s state evolves relative to one’s goals or desires. Thus not
only does a person feel ‘positive’ as their beliefs shift toward a
desired state (as a positive RPE would entail); but this positive
emotion has the color of happiness if the current belief is certain
but the color of hope if the corresponding belief is uncertain.
This experimental and theoretical progress attests to the
feasibility of unifying the ‘client’ (subjective) and the ‘decision-
maker’ (objective) perspectives on emotion. The links between
the dynamics of reward and the dynamics of emotion show great
promise and need a lot of experimental testing, but the ﬁrst steps
of clinical importance have been taken.
Results
Approaching motivational and emotional disorders through the
lens of (computational) reward processing furnishes a number
of important results with respect to two of the polarities that
have plagued psychiatry but has not made as much progress with
respect to a third.
Biological vs. Psychosocial
Computational psychiatry simultaneously addresses the
computational level of what the problem is, the algorithmic
level of how it can be operationalized in terms of information
processing, and the implementation level in terms of the neural
substrate. More practical considerations, such as the behavioral
economics of interpersonal exchanges (Camerer, 2003), has
obliged scientists to integrate social psychology and neuroscience
with basic, or impersonal, reward processing. Let us consider two
ﬁndings: ﬁrst, that subjective wellbeing follows RPEs (Rutledge
et al., 2014) as above. Second, during interpersonal exchange
people may encode both ordinary RPEs (e.g., I’m pleasantly
surprised with what she gave me) but also person-representation
prediction errors [She will be pleasantly surprised about me,
as I’m about to reciprocate generously (Xiang et al., 2012)].
If ordinary RPEs drive some aspects of emotion, it would be
strange indeed if person-representation RPEs were unrelated to
the strong emotions we experience in an interpersonal sphere:
for example, their fragility in emotionally unstable personality or
their presumed dearth in psychopathy.
On the other hand, of course, we are far from elucidating the
actual way in which social emotions and non-social emotions
are represented in their neurological substrates and, inversely,
how social and non-social emotional processing changes this
substrate, be it through trauma (Chen and Etkin, 2013), learning
in psychosis (Murray et al., 2008) or subtle plasticity (Garvert
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et al., 2015). Signatures of biased reward processing have been
found in several disorders but they are far from explaining these
disorders either in the sense of explaining symptoms in the here
and now or in the sense of predicting the course of the disorder
much better than traditional methods (Whelan et al., 2014).
Disease vs. Maladjustment
Learning about reward takes place at diﬀerent levels of
information processing. Let us consider the example of psychosis.
The early, and celebrated, aberrant salience hypothesis of
psychotic disorders (Kapur et al., 2005) postulated a disease
level wherein dopamine discharges might be epileptic-like,
unrelated to information processing, leading to the establishment
of psychotic associations (both beliefs and choices) at the
phenomenological and behavioral levels. Such an account
separates the diseased brain reporting aberrant increased
salience; and the healthy brain downstream that tries to make
sense of this abnormal salience. However no epileptiform
activity has been demonstrated. Increased aberrant salience has
been demonstrated in association with schizotypy in healthy
individuals and in medicated patients with delusions (Roiser
et al., 2009); however, it does not seem to be prominent in
prepsychotic and early psychotic states, where no changes in
aberrant salience have been found so far (Smieskova et al., 2015).
At the same time there is evidence that exaggerated dopamine
reactivity to stress is associated with psychotic experiences in
predisposed individuals (Hernaus et al., 2015).
Therefore the evidence points toward disease being an
overall brain-state, the result of adjustment to psychobiological
challenges performed by the individual’s neural phenotype.
Computationally, this is inference about salient stimuli at the
developmental timescale; while genetically it is likely to be
based on ‘intermediate phenotypes,’ e.g., of atypical connectivity
(Cao et al., 2016). We can see that this framework renders
the dualistic view of ‘disease’ and ‘maladjustment’ obsolete. The
canonical teaching of an illness being explained in terms of
predisposing, precipitating and perpetuating factors ﬁts much
more comfortably with the dynamical view of computational
psychiatry, wherein dopamine reactivity or the interplay of prior
and posterior beliefs are meaningful (if suboptimal) at diﬀerent
but intimately linked Marrian levels. The computational models
of Ruppin and coworkers (Horn and Ruppin, 1994) illustrate
a beautiful early example of such thinking. They suggested
that the brain performed compensatory adjustments to long-
range dysconnectivity in order to preserve the ability to activate
appropriate perceptions in response to stimuli. However, these
compensatory adjustments result in a propensity for percepts that
bear small correlation to stimuli (i.e., hallucinations) to arise.
Neurobiological and computational research has greatly reﬁned
these insights. We close this brief foray into psychosis research
by point out a promising theme relevant to the role of reward,
the focus of this issue. From the early theories of dopamine-
dependent signal-to-noise (Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992;
Servan-Schreiber et al., 1996) to the inﬂuential analysis of the
role of precision at sensory vs. cognitive levels (Adams et al.,
2013) to the ﬁndings of exaggerated dopamine reactivity to stress
(Hernaus et al., 2015), psychosis has been about aberrations and
compensatory changes in synaptic gain. The original aberrant
salience theory of psychosis has opened new horizons regarding
the role of reward- and threat- anticipation in psychosis; yet it
may be the increasingly sophisticated understanding of synaptic
gain, especially in its guise as precision calculated in cortical
NMDA ﬁelds (Adams et al., 2013), that helps us go beyond the
oversimpliﬁed aspects of salience theory.
At a theoretical level some biological factors are so dominant
that to call them ‘predisposing factors’ is misleading (e.g., Down’s
syndrome causing Alzheimer’s disease). These can be thought of
as maladjustments at another level of the hierarchy – where an
evolving reproductive apparatus has not learnt to avoid trisomies.
Such maladjustments may be chance events or indeed the result
of optimizing compromises between priorities.
At the same time the normative view of reward processing
contains an ambiguity that needs acknowledgment and
resolution. This is that for any input-output behavioral pattern a
cost structure can be found for which this pattern of behavior is
optimal (Daunizeau et al., 2010). For any behavior we can simply
say that the person in question emits it because it genuinely
optimizes their happiness. This is analogous to the psychological
assertion that a patient ‘refuses to change because it would be
too painful for them,’ or that an addict or pedophile simply
ﬁnds indulging too rewarding to trade it against an alternative.
Given a conception of what is valuable, e.g., making the most
money, we can oﬀer to explain how people attempt to optimize
their behavior, and which parts of the process may go wrong. In
current practice most research that investigates abnormalities of
reward processing takes as a starting point an assumption that
there are rewards out there, which have a normative relationship
with the individual’s behavior and that people should value and
should seek. When a rat or human are hungry, two lumps of
sugar are more rewarding than one, and we can measure how
much harder subjects are willing to work for the chance to get
them. We have a normative yardstick: our subject should work
just hard enough to maximize the utility of (sugar + eﬀort).
Motivational disorder is then deﬁned as a statistically signiﬁcant
deviation from this norm. However, in the real world it is hard
to know what people should care about and computational,
biological and psychosocial research agendas could do well to
take seriously what we don’t know.
Computational psychiatry does not do as well, as yet,
when dealing with the complexity of human emotion. The
problem is acute not because we should address emotion in
its huge complexity, but because we have so far dealt with it
by a simpliﬁcation into positive vs. negative emotion, albeit
tagged according to experimental tasks in question. If human
emotion relevant to psychopathology contains multiple facets
as inseparable parts of a phenomenological states, and if these
rich states have computational relevance, then current studies
are likely to be very remote from actual clinical relevance.
Paradiso and Rudrauf (2012) put it eloquently: “... the fear
experienced by a mountain climber in potential danger has levels
of social complexity unlikely to be reached in mice. In addition
to fearing his own end, the mountain climber anticipating a
possible death is equally likely also to be scared of losing his
spouse and children, leaving them fatherless and exposed to
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dangers, of the ﬁnancial consequences of his death on them,
of the emotional eﬀects on his parents, and so on. He may
simultaneously experience shame (another social emotion) and
danger (perhaps toward his self) for having neglected what
he thinks were routine safety measures. A human facing the
possibility of ceasing to exist has emotions that encompass the
inescapable social nature and interconnectedness of our species
and multiple levels of self-representation and projection.” We
don’t really know which complex emotional constellations found
in psychiatric disorders are most relevant, especially for decision-
making that can be considered pathological. At the moment we
haven’t developed a good way of addressing this most important
question scientiﬁcally either.
Discussion
A computational psychiatry of emotional disorders has begun
to put on the table key issues that have plagued psychiatry.
It provides a framework for bridging biological-psychological-
social divides and oﬀers novel perspectives on the question
of emotional-motivational ‘diseases’ versus ‘problems.’ This
is rendered possible by formulating disorders of motivation
and emotion within a normative probabilistic framework
which oﬀers sophisticated and neurobiologically plausible
accounts of how reward motivate decisions. Many challenges
remain. Phenomenology is only tentatively connected to
computation; much-promising theoretical concepts have not
been put to experimental test, while their normative basis is
not understood. For example, we have no rigorous normative
account of what utility structures correspond to mental
health. A key example is how reward should be discounted
in the face of time (inter-temporal discounting), valence
(complex discounting of negative future events, including
dread) or social distance (social discounting). Therefore the
statistical connections that have been found between temporal
discounting and addictive disorders lack a true normative
basis.
Let us now consider a libertarian (or Szaszian) critique of
reward processing as a basis for psychiatric research. Szasz
protested against a medicalization of deviant behavior, believing
that so called psychiatric disorders lack an adequate biological
basis. Hence ‘medicalizing’ unjustiﬁably transgressed peoples’
autonomy (Szasz, 1960). Deciding a priori what reward people
should valuemore (asmanifested in their choices) or what reward
they should care about (as manifested in their phenomenology) is
just as much ‘playing god’ once we move beyond trivial choices:
in many cases psychiatrically relevant situations are complex
enough to negate a dream of ﬁnding a normative standard against
which to measure motivational disorder. Reward processing
should maximize long-term outcomes and so in research practice
we use paradigms that have well-deﬁned ends or may be
thought of as going on ‘for ever’ (as for example near the
beginning of a task with hundreds of trials). Yet what sorts
of long-term outcomes are involved in the long-term reward
processing important for psychiatry? Individual reproductive
ﬁtness? We have no clear idea, and the temptation is to
import convenient social norms, rendering our framework only
pseudo-normative. Even in the simple example of working
for lumps of sugar, mentioned above, there will usually be
some evaluation of eﬀort and sugar5 that renders behavior
optimal. This evaluation may be normative with respect to the
person’s history, not the task. In any psychiatrically relevant
situation considerations rapidly multiply. For example, what if
our hungry human is overweight? And what if the reproductive
ﬁtness associated with slimness (attracting mates) is socially
constructed?
Thomas Szasz and the libertarian tradition (to which the
authors belong) argue that rather than impose norms on people –
say about which reward would maximize their life expectancy,
their reproductive success – we should respect the priorities
they have and, by deﬁnition, accept a person’s autonomy to
seek their own reward by deploying their own motivational
structures. So is there no such thing as a motivational or
emotional disorder and in fact everyone is just doing the best
they can? Szasz would claim that the dream of aberrant reward
processing pinning down what’s essential about motivational
and emotional disorders is no more solid than the ‘chemical
imbalance’ theory of depression or of Freud’s ‘unconscious
motivation’ theory of mental illness. To be more speciﬁc if
the Reward processing domain of the otherwise promising
‘Research Domain Criteria’ framework (Casey et al., 2013) is
applied too simplistically we may end up with exactly the same
mistakes as in previous biological or psychoanalytic normative
straightjackets.
If a Szaszian position simply accepts peoples’ choices for
what they are, its extreme opposite would be a 1984 world
where people have been taught through social, psychological and
biological interventions, not only what to decide but actually
what to desire. While we recoil from the Szaszian extreme
as it is dismissive of the importance of psychiatric suﬀering,
psychiatrists cannot dictate what patients should care about –
even about their symptoms. The so-called recovery movement
can already teach computational neuroscientists that the rewards
that patients really care about are not so much to do with
their symptoms as with their life goals and values. In that case
perhaps the priorities for researching archetypal motivational
disorders like depression are not about ‘what motivational
disturbance underpins depression’ but ‘what decision structures
of the depressed can help them fulﬁll their values’ (Hayes et al.,
1999). Here we have dialectic, because the scientiﬁc baby should
not be thrown away with the essentialist bath water. The clinician
could bring to the patient a biopsychosocial assessment of ‘wrong
priors,’ ‘wrong models,’ or ‘wrong utilities.’ They would then
decide in dialog with a patient, with a diagnosis of say the
successor of ‘Depressive Episode,’ now deﬁned in computational
terms, what key needs must be targeted and optimized. When
it comes to the severe mental illnesses, formulations that go
beyond ‘Schizophrenia,’ or indeed ‘Abnormal Salience syndrome’
(Van Os, 2009) will help clinicians and patients consider
emotional and motivational dispositions both as threats and as
5i.e., the person’s goal or preference priors: Friston et al. (2013).
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instruments toward recovery. Of course this account assumes
patients with some capacity to consider the issues in question,
which may itself be severely compromised – for example in acute
psychosis.
Why bring in the concept of need when considering reward
and emotional disorder? Because biologically reward is not an
end in itself, but a good surrogate toward longer-term biological
goals. The stability properties of a self-perpetuating system, like
a species in an ecosystem, can be conceptualized in terms of
having the ‘purpose’ or ‘goal’ to keep perpetuating the system
(e.g., the species). One has to be careful philosophically to avoid
false teleological justiﬁcations, but in the ﬁrst instance this is
small print. We assert that there are physiological homeostatic
needs, reproductive/sexual needs, and more complex ones such
as needs for social contact. Furthermore, people are motivated
by reward that extend beyond their own lives. They will often,
in fact, sacriﬁce their life for much less than ‘two brothers or
four cousins,’ as mathematical evolutionary biologists have put
it (Maynard Smith, 1993). Each of these needs entails goals,
desires and reward; all are relevant to psychiatry; but probably
few can be the target of fruitful intervention for each particular
patient.
Conclusion: Computational Psychiatry
must be Profoundly Biopsychosocial
In the best possible world scientists will take seriously the
question of what needs really matter for patients, what reward
form the best surrogates or milestones toward the fulﬁllment
of such needs and will do so in open collaboration with
relevant stakeholders. At ﬁrst sight the rigorous, biologically
based discipline of computational psychiatry seems far from
patients’ expressed needs, yet the fact that it puts reward
and motivation at the center of understanding psychiatric
disorder gives it a privileged vantage point toward serving
patients.
Acknowledgments
RD is supported by a Wellcome Trust Senior Investigator
Award (ref 098362/Z/12/Z). The current work is funded
by a Strategic Award by the Wellcome Trust (ref 095844/7
/11/Z). MM is also supported by the Biomedical Research
Council.
References
Adams, R. A., Stephan, K. E., Brown, H. R., Frith, C. D., and Friston, K. J.
(2013). The computational anatomy of psychosis. Front. Psychiatry 4:47. doi:
10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00047
APA (2013). DSM-5 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
Arlington, TX: American Psychiatric Association.
Bentall, R. (2009). Doctoring the Mind: Is Our Current Treatment of Mental Illness
Really any Good? New York, NY: NYU Press.
Boyle, M., and Johnstone, L. (2014). Alternatives to psychiatric diagnosis. Lancet
Psychiatry 1, 409–411. doi: 10.1016/S2215-0366(14)70359-1
Busemeyer, J., and Bruza, P. (2012). Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511997716
Busemeyer, J., Wang, Z., and Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. (2009). Empirical
comparison of Markov and quantum models of decision making. J. Math.
Psychol. 53, 423–433. doi: 10.1016/j.jmp.2009.03.002
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic
Interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cao, H., Dixson, L., Meyer-Lindenberg, A., and Tost, H. (2016). Functional
connectivity measures as schizophrenia intermediate phenotypes: advances,
limitations, and future directions. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 36, 7–14.
Casey, B. J., Craddock, N., Cuthbert, B. N., Hyman, S. E., Lee, F. S., and Ressler, K.
(2013). DSM-5 and RDoC: progress in psychiatry research? Nat. Rev. 4, 810–
814. doi: 10.1038/nrn3621
Chen, A., and Etkin, A. (2013). Hippocampal network connectivity and
activation diﬀerentiates post-traumatic stress disorder from generalized
anxiety disorder. Neuropsychopharmacology 38, 1889–1898. doi: 10.1038/npp.
2013.122
Cohen, J. D., and Servan-Schreiber, D. (1992). Context, cortex, and dopamine: a
connectionist approach to behavior and biology in schizophrenia. Psychol. Rev.
99, 45–77. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.99.1.45
Daunizeau, J., den Ouden, H. E. M., Pessiglione, M., Kiebel, S. J., Friston, K. J., and
Stephan, K. E. (2010). Observing the observer (II): deciding when to decide.
PLoS ONE 5:e15555. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0015555
Dolnick, E. (1998). Madness on the Couch: Blaming the Victim in the Heyday of
Psychoanalysis. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
Friston, K. J., Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T., Moutoussis, M., Behrens, T., and
Dolan, R. J. (2013). The anatomy of choice: active inference and agency. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 7:598. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00598
Garvert, M. M., Moutoussis, M., Kurth-Nelson, Z., Behrens, T., and Dolan,
R. J. (2015). Learning-induced plasticity in medial prefrontal cortex predicts
preference malleability. Neuron 85, 418–428. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2014.
12.033
Guitart-Masip, M., Huys, Q., Fuentemilla, L., Dayan, P., Duzel, E., and
Dolan, R. (2012). Go and no-go learning in reward and punishment:
interactions between aﬀect and eﬀect. NeuroImage 62, 154–166. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.04.024
Hayes, J., and Bell, V. (2014). Diagnosis: one useful method among
many. Lancet Psychiatry 1, 412–413. doi: 10.1016/S2215-0366(14)
70399-2
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., andWilson, K. G. (1999).Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy: An Experiential Approach to Behavior Change. New York, NY:
Guildford.
Hernaus, D., Collip, D., Lataster, J., Viechtbauer, W., Myin, E., Ceccarini, J.,
et al. (2015). Psychotic reactivity to daily life stress and the dopamine
system: a study combining experience sampling and [18F]fallypride positron
emission tomography. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 124, 27–37. doi: 10.1037/abn00
00010
Horn, D., and Ruppin, E. (1994). Synaptic compensation in attractor neural
networks: modeling neuropathological ﬁndings in schizophrenia. Neural
Computation (in press).
Huys, Q., Guitart-Masip, M., and Dayan, P. (2014). Decision theoretic psychiatry.
Clin. Psychol. Sci. 3, 374–377.
Huys, Q., Moutoussis, M., and Willams, J. (2011). Are computational models of
any use to psychiatry? Neural Netw. 24, 544–551. doi: 10.1016/j.neunet.2011.
03.001
Joﬃly, M., and Coricelli, G. (2013). Emotional valence and the free-energy
principle. PLoS Comput. Biol. 9:e1003094. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.
1003094
Kapur, S., Mizrahi, R., and Li, M. (2005). From dopamine to salience
to psychosis–linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology
of psychosis. Schizophr. Res. 79, 59–68. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2005.
01.003
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. New York, NY: Freeman.
Maynard Smith, J. (1993). The Theory of Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Montague, P. R., Dolan, R. J., Friston, K. J., and Dayan, P. (2012). Computational
psychiatry. TICS 16, 72–80. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.018
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1445
Moutoussis et al. Broken brains and misguided minds
Murray, G., Corlett, P., Clark, L., Pessiglione, M., Blackwell, A., Honey, G.,
et al. (2008). Substantia nigra/ventral tegmental reward prediction error
disruption in psychosis. Mol. Psychiatry 13, 267–276. doi: 10.1038/sj.mp.
4002058
Paradiso, S., and Rudrauf, D. (2012). Struggle for life, struggle for love and
recognition: the neglected self in social cognitive neuroscience. Dialogues Clin.
Neurosci. 14, 65–75.
Roiser, J. P., Stephan, K. E., den Ouden, H. E. M., Barnes, T. R. E., Friston, K. J., and
Joyce, E. M. (2009). Do patients with schizophrenia exhibit aberrant salience?
Psychol. Med. 39, 199–209. doi: 10.1017/S0033291708003863
Romito, P. (2008). A Deafening Silence: Hidden Violence Against Women and
Children. Bristol: Policy Press.
Rushworth, M., Noonan, M., Boorman, E., Walton, M., and Behrens, T. (2011).
Frontal cortex and reward-guided learning and decision-making. Neuron 70,
1054–1069. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2011.05.014
Rutledge, R., Skandali, N., Dayan, P., and Dolan, R. (2014). A computational and
neural model of momentary subjective well-being. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
111, 12252–12257. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1407535111
Servan-Schreiber, D., Cohen, J. D., and Steingard, S. (1996). Schizophrenic deﬁcits
in the processing of context. A test of a theoretical model. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry
53, 1105–1112. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.1996.01830120037008
Seymour, B. O., Doherty, J. P., Dayan, P., Koltzenburg, M., Jones, A. K., Dolan,
R. J., et al. (2004). Temporal diﬀerence models describe higher-order learning
in humans. Nature 429, 664–667. doi: 10.1038/nature02581
Smieskova, R., Roiser, J. P., Chaddock, C. A., Schmidt, A., Harrisberger, F.,
Bendfeldt, K., et al. (2015). Modulation of motivational salience processing
during the early stages of psychosis. Schizophr. Res. 166, 17–23. doi:
10.1016/j.schres.2015.04.036
Szasz, T. (1960). The myth of mental illness. Am. Psychol. 15, 113–118. doi:
10.1037/h0046535
VanOs, J. (2009). ‘Salience syndrome’ replaces ‘schizophrenia’ in DSM-V and ICD-
11: psychiatry’s evidence-based entry into the 21st century? Acta Psychiatrica
Scandinavica 120, 363–372. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-0447.2009.01456.x
Whelan, R., Watts, R., Orr, C., Althoﬀ, R., Artiges, E., Banaschewski, T., et al.
(2014). Neuropsychosocial proﬁles of current and future adolescent alcohol
misusers.Nature 512, 185–189. doi: 10.1038/nature13402
Xiang, T., Ray, D., Lohrenz, T., Dayan, P., and Montague, P. R. (2012).
Computational phenotyping of two-person interactions reveals diﬀerential
neural response to depth-of-thought. PLoS Comput. Biol. 8:e1002841. doi:
10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002841
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Moutoussis, Story and Dolan. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication
in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1445
